The well-known question whether regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the multilateral trading system (MTS) are "strangers, friends, or foes" (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996) has gained new importance with the widespread proliferation of RTAs in recent years. Based on an extensive data set which covers most of world trade over the past 60 years and about 240 regional trade agreements, we analyze the relationship between RTAs and the MTS by combining the gravity model framework with vector auto-regression analysis. Impulse-response-functions robustly suggest that multilateral trade liberalization responds in a signi…cantly positive way to regional trade liberalization. We also …nd robust evidence that RTA liberalization Grangercauses GATT/WTO liberalization. Thus our results indicate that RTAs do not undermine the MTS and serve as building blocs to multilateral trade liberalization.
Motivation
While the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) grew only slowly until the beginning of the 1990s, it has remarkably increased since then. In December 2008, 230 RTAs were noti…ed to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the WTO (2009c) expects close to 400 RTAs by 2010. At …rst sight, RTAs con ‡ict with the most-favored nations clause (GATT Article I, GATS Article II) which prohibits discriminatory behavior among WTO members. However, WTO members are permitted to establish or enter regional arrangements under speci…c conditions which are de…ned in GATT Article XXIV, the decision on "Di¤erential and more favorable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of developing countries"(the so-called Enabling Clause), and GATS Article V (WTO, 2009c) .
How does this wide proliferation of regionalism relate to global trade liberalization? Following Bhagwati (1991) RTAs could be either stumbling or building blocs to global trade liberalization, i. e. RTAs could contribute to further multilateral liberalization by complementing GATT/WTO or they could impede multilateral trade liberalization. Baldwin (2004) summarizes the logic and fears which are associated with RTAs as stumbling blocs to global trade liberalization and identi…es two key risks of regionalism. Firstly, regional liberalization might be a substitute for multilateral liberalization since it i) dampens nations'intentness for further multilateral liberalization and ii) diverts policy makers'attention away from WTO negotiations (e. g. Bhagwati, 1992, and Krueger, 1995) . Secondly, regionalism might alter the division of power so that i) small nations are even more dominated by hegemonic powers and ii) the possibility of tensions (and even trade wars) between trade blocs increases (Panagariya, 1999) . According to Baldwin (2004) , these fears are mainly based on the historical experience during the interwar period. Summers (1991) rejects this pessimistic view and points out that after World War II regionalism contributed to tari¤ liberalization and that there is no clear evidence that regionalism has undermined multilateralism. Creamer (2003) and Trejos (2005) emphasize that RTAs are not inherently protectionist, but instead can even help reduce political tensions between countries. 1 Additionally, RTAs can stimulate both internal and international political dynamics by providing an experimental ground for new liberalization ideas. 2 Moreover, RTAs can improve the stability and credibility of countries which should have positive e¤ects on multilateral negotiations (Paiva and Gazel, 2003) .
In contrast to the extensive theoretical literature, empirical research has so far been rather limited. Limao (2006 Limao ( , 2007 studies the impact of US RTAs on the evolution of the US external multilateral tari¤s before and after the Uruguay round negotiations. 3 In his regression analysis Limao (2006 Limao ( , 2007 …nds that, on similar products, the US liberalized external multilateral tari¤s towards non-RTA partners much more than towards regional trading partners. The rationale of this policy could be that the US o¤ers preferences to receive concessions from the recipients. Since the concessions are all the more valuable the larger the preference margin is, the US tries to prevent the erosion of preferences by resisting multilateral liberalization.
Thus, he concludes that RTAs act as a stumbling bloc to US multilateral trade liberalization. Karacaovali and Limao (2008) study how RTAs 4 a¤ect the EU's external multilateral tari¤s basically using the same methodology and time period as Limao (2006, 2007) . They …nd that the EU cut its external multilateral tari¤s on imports from regional trading partners merely by half as much as the external multilateral tari¤s on products imported from non-members. Karacaovali and Limao (2008) conclude that EU's regional arrangements appear to be stumbling blocs to multilateral trade liberalization. Estevadeordal et al. (2008) focus on the impact of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community (CAN) on the multilateral tari¤ setting behavior of ten Latin-American countries based on data on preferential an 1 Bergsten (1997) presents the example of France and Germany which are both members of the European Union (EU).
2 See Trejos (2005) , Pomfret (2006) , Bergsten (1997), and Folsom (2008) . 3 While Limao (2006) incorporates North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and US-Israel in his analysis, Limao (2007) focuses only on CBI and ATPA. 4 In particular, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), GSP for least developed countries (GSPL), African Caribbean & Paci…c states (ACP), Mediterranean countries (MED), Central & East European states (CEC), European Free Trade Association (EFTX). MFN tari¤s over the period 1990-2001. 5 In particular, they regress the change in external multilateral tari¤s on several control variables, including membership in MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. Their results indicate that RTAs act as building blocs for multilateral trade liberalization in Latin America. Magee and Lee (2001) examine how the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) a¤ected external tari¤s of its members. Using the ratio of EEC's external tari¤s in 1983 to external tari¤s in 1968 on the imports from 51 industries, Magee and Lee (2001) …nd that the claim of a "Fortress Europe" is unfounded as the common external tari¤s of the EEC continuously declined. Foroutan (1998) carries out a descriptive analysis on the external trading behavior of 50 developing countries over the period 1965-1995. Using trade ‡ows, import tari¤s and trade liberalization indicators, she examines whether there is a systematic relationship between developing countries'membership in a RTA and the external liberalization of their trade. Her results reject such a systematic relationship.
Taken together, the empirical literature -as well as the theoretical literature -is inconclusive as RTAs are sometimes found to be stumbling blocs and in some cases to be building blocs for multilateral trade liberalization.
From a methodological point of view, these approaches are limited in several ways. The studies investigate selected countries and regions only, thereby ignoring the interactions with other RTAs these countries or their trading partners are members of. The studies cover rather limited time periods which are generally too short to account for the political dynamics between regionalism and multilateralism summarized by Baldwin (2004) and emphasized by Bhagwati (1992) as well as Summers (1991) . The time periods are also too short to adequately account for the so-called …rst wave of regionalism in the 1950s and more importantly the new developments in regionalism since the 1990s and the 2000s (second and third wave of regionalism).
The studies focus only on the external tari¤ setting behavior of countries engaged in regional arrangements thereby neglecting other dimensions of trade liberalization, such as non-tari¤ barriers. Foroutan (1998) points out that other indicators, such as actual trade ‡ows and trade liberalization indicators, are also important.
This study adds to the literature in several ways. We examine a sample of 184 countries with 240 RTAs so that we can control for interactions between various regional arrangements and a country's membership in more than one RTA. Our data set covers the period from 1953-2006 which is long enough to adequately account for the political dynamics between regionalism and multilateralism, and to include the beginnings of regional arrangements during the 1950s as well as more recent developments. Based on the building bloc/stumbling bloc discussion, we investigate the relationship between multilateral and regional trade liberalization. The literature so far has associated trade liberalization with the countries'external tari¤ setting behavior. We follow Foroutan (1998) and measure trade liberalization by the actual impact of regional and multilateral trade liberalization on trade ‡ows so that we can account for the whole range of trade liberalizing measures.
To investigate the dynamic e¤ects of RTAs and especially the possibly causal interrelation between regional and multilateral trade liberalization, we combine a gravity model framework with vector auto-regressive (VAR) analysis. Using impulseresponse-functions, our study shows that trade liberalization on the multilateral level responds signi…cantly positive to regional trade liberalization. Additionally, we …nd that RTA liberalization Granger-causes multilateral liberalization. By contrast, there is no robust evidence for such an e¤ect in the opposite direction. Thus, the results suggest that regional trade liberalization does not undermine but rather contributes to multilateral trade liberalization.
General Research Strategy
The …rst wave of regionalism in the 1950s and 1960s was accompanied by a vivid discussion on the e¤ects of RTAs on trade. More speci…cally, the discussion was driven by static analysis, i. e. the evaluation of trade creation and trade diversion (Viner, 1950) . With the second wave of regionalism, Summers (1991) and Bhagwati (1991) initiated an important debate on the interrelation between regional trade arrangements and the multilateral trading system that focused on the political dy-namic dimension of the issue. 6 Bhagwati (1991, p. 77) discussed the dichotomy of RTAs as stumbling blocs or building blocs for the multilateral trade liberalization. Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) further re…ned this question and ask whether RTAs and the multilateral trading system (MTS) are "strangers, friends, or foes", adding the possibility that RTAs and the MTS develop independently from each other.
In our analysis, we proceed in three steps. First, we estimate the time-speci…c impact of both GATT/WTO and RTAs on international trade for each year using an extensive gravity model and …xed e¤ects Poisson maximum likelihood (FE-PML) estimation to derive two time-series that measure the impact of multilateral and regional liberalization on trade. Secondly, based on the two time-series we use a vector auto-regressive (VAR) approach to estimate the e¤ect of multilateral on regional trade liberalization and vice versa. Thirdly, we examine their causal interrelation based on impulse-response-functions and Granger-causality analysis, i. e.
we investigate whether and how regional trade liberalization reacts to multilateral trade liberalization, and vice versa.
The Gravity Model
In a …rst step, we use a standard gravity model to obtain the time-speci…c e¤ects of both multilateral (represented by GATT/WTO membership) and regional (represented by RTA membership) agreements on international trade. In particular, we regress bilateral trade ‡ows on countries' membership in GATT/WTO and RTAs together with standard gravity control variables to estimate the time-speci…c impact of multilateral and regional trade liberalization on trade ‡ows for each year.
The basic model associates trade ‡ows with the distance of the trading partners and their income. This standard model has been supplemented by additional independent variables such as cultural, geographic, and historical factors to control for other "natural"sources of trade. These determinants also include trade agreements 6 During the …rst wave of regionalism, the only successful regional trade agreement was represented by the European Community and regional trade agreements were evaluated in static comparative analysis. At the beginning of the 1980s, the United States recognized that multilateral trade liberalization was di¢ cult to achieve and departed from multilateralism by building up bilateral agreements with Israel (1985) , Canada (1989) and Mexico (1994) (Panagariya, 1999) . With this turn from multilateralism toward regionalism as an alternative way of reaching global free trade, Bhagwati (1993) introduced the dynamic time-path dimension. like GATT/WTO and RTAs. 7 In formal terms, the model is given by:
where i and j denote the importing and exporting country, respectively, and t depicts time. The vector X ijt represents the standard control variables in gravity models. 8 is the common intercept, ij and t represent country pair speci…c and time dummies, respectively; " ijt is a white noise error term. The variable both partners inside the GATT/WTO is a binary dummy variable that is de…ned as one if both trading partners participate in GATT/WTO in year t, and zero otherwise.Similarly, both partners inside RTA is a binary dummy variable that equals to one if both trading partners belong to the same RTA in year t. The term P 2006 t=1953 t D t both partners inside GATT/WTO ijt generates 54 dummy variables that represent the time-speci…c impact of multilateral trade liberalization. In particular, D t is de…ned as one for a speci…c year t, else zero, and is multiplied by the binary variable GATT/WTO membership which is de…ned as one if both trading partners are GATT/WTO members in year t, else zero. As an example, D 1970 is one in year 1970, else zero. The combined term D 1970 both partners inside GATT/WTO ij1970 is one if both trading partners are GATT/WTO members in 1970, else zero. Thus, 1970 represents the impact of multilateral trade liberalization in year 1970. 9 The same transformation is undertaken for membership in RTAs using the term P 2006 t=1957 # t D t both partners inside same RTA ijt . 10 Generally, t and # t represent the estimated coe¢ cients re-7 Regarding the theoretical foundation of the gravity model see among others Anderson (1979 ), Bergstrand (1985 , Helpman and Krugman (1985) , Deardor¤ (1998) , and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . 8 See appendix for a description of the variables. 9 Note that this speci…cation does not consider the duration of GATT/WTO membership. We have also taken the duration of GATT/WTO membership into account and found that it does not change the results of the gravity model estimation signi…cantly. 10 Note that the variable both partners inside RTA only accounts for mere membership in regional trade agreements. Additionally, we have also experimented with various dimensions of regional garding the time-speci…c impact of multilateral (GATT/WTO) and regional (RTA) trade liberalization for each year in the data set, respectively.
We account for these time-speci…c e¤ects of GATT/WTO and RTAs as these institutions are subject to a continuous change, i. e. GATT/WTO and RTAs in 1970 are qualitatively not the same institutions as in 2009 -independent from the number of member countries or the number of RTAs as such. For instance, GATT/WTO currently regulates a much wider range of issues in more depth than in former times with RTAs having changed in a similar way (WTO, 2007) . Regionalism during the 1950s/1960s is often characterized as "old"regionalism and so-called "shallow"
integration. This type of integration was regional in a geographical sense, did not get beyond mere tari¤ liberalization and rarely took place between developed and less developed countries (Limao, 2007) . Today, the so-called "new"regionalism is much more di¤erentiated. It goes well beyond mere tari¤ liberalization and features deeper forms of integration, such as economic reforms, harmonization and coordination of economic policies as well as factor market integration among others (Bur…sher et al., 2003) . As the impact of GATT/WTO and RTAs on trade liberalization has changed over time, we estimate the time-speci…c impact for each year individually.
Note that we do not model membership in GATT/WTO or RTAs according to Bayer and Bergstrand (2004 , 2007 , 2009 ) and Egger et al. (2008 who refer to the endogeneity of RTAs. While our approach is a …rst solution to the multilateralism versus regionalism nexus, the implementation of endogenous membership in international institutions will be an interesting enhancement for future research.
An immanent problem of estimating the impact of institutional variables is spurious correlation and bias due to omitted (institutional) variables which might also be important for international trade. The e¤ect of trade liberalization might not only be driven by international trade agreements but also by national factors. The trade agreements. In particular, we accounted for de facto RTA membership by using time lags (Tomz et al., 2007 , who account for de facto membership of GATT/WTO members). Additionally, we di¤erentiated between pure bilateral (two single countries form a RTA), bilateral (a RTA forms an agreement with a single country) and plurilateral RTAs (two RTAs form an arrangement). We also accounted for the number of di¤erent RTAs one country is engaged in. Furthermore, we di¤erentiated between WTO-noti…ed and non-noti…ed RTAs, regional and cross-regional RTAs, RTAs with only WTO members and RTAs with at least one non-member. Finally, we considered e¤ective RTAs according to Holmes (2005) . Again, we …nd that the results of our study do not change signi…cantly. political system could be such a third factor which might have a positive or negative impact on international trade, as discussed e. g. by Decker and Lim (2009 ), Eichengreen and Leblang (2007 ), and Yu (2007 . To control for this e¤ect, we include the variable polity which is a measure for the political regime and is scaled between +10 (strongly democratic) and -10 (strongly autocratic). We estimate the model using …xed e¤ect Poisson maximum likelihood (FE-PML) estimation. Since comprehensive trade data sets are typically characterized by numerous zero trade ‡ows, we have to take them into account to avoid biased estimates. 11 As the traditional log-linearization of the gravity model cannot account for zero trade ‡ows, we follow Verbeek (2008) 12 and apply the Poisson maximum likelihood (PML) estimator. 13 The (expected) trade ‡ows can then be modeled using an exponential function:
where y ijt represents bilateral trade ‡ows and x ijt denotes a vector of exogenous variables. The non-negativity of the exponential function ensures that the predicted values for y ijt are also non-negative. 14 As this approach does not require a loglinearization of the variables, the problem of zero trade ‡ows can be avoided.
Step Two: The VAR-Model
In a second step, we use a vector auto-regressive (VAR) framework based on the two time-series derived from the gravity model to estimate the e¤ect of GATT/WTO (multilateral) trade liberalization on RTA (regional) trade liberalization and vice versa.
As discussed above, the e¤ects of multilateral and regional liberalization on trade 11 The current dataset comprises about 46% zero values. 12 While Verbeek (2008) provides an overview of the Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimation, Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and Winkelmann (2008) discuss the econometric analysis of count data more comprehensively. 13 Regarding the application of gravity models, several authors propose the estimation of the gravity model in its genuine multiplicative, non-linear form using Poisson maximum likelihood estimation (Henderson and Millimet, 2008 , Westerlund and Wilhelmsson, 2009 , Siliverstovs and Schumacher, 2009 , Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006 , or Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2006 . 14 According to Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) , the index function x 0 ijt need not be linear either. may be subject to various interrelations. In particular, we identify the following factors which might induce a dynamic political link between multilateral and regional trade liberalization. As potentially negative e¤ects, regionalism might dampen nations'enthusiasm for multilateral liberalization, divert policy makers'attention away from multilateral liberalization and create tensions between trading blocs. As potentially positive e¤ects, regionalism might relax political resentments between trading blocs, serve as an experimental ground for new or controversial issues and improve a country's international reputation. 15
It is beyond the scope of this paper to solve for a full dynamic and game-theoretic equilibrium based on these factors. By contrast, we presume two empirical reaction functions for multilateral and regional liberalization. In particular, we are interested in the question how multilateral liberalization responds to a regional trade liberalization stimulus, and vice versa. Therefore, we construct a VAR model consisting of the auto-regressive processes of two time series, namely the yearly time-speci…c impact of both GATT/WTO t and RTAs # t on international trade. 16 The corresponding bivariate model can be formulated as
where L is the backshift-operator with ij (L) = 1 ij L 1 + ::: + p ij L p for i; j = 1; 2; 3. p denotes the lag order, c i is a constant, while d i;t is a time dummy, and u i;t represents the error term with i = f1; 2g. The time series VAR model is assumed to be covariance stationary. The error term vector is i.i.d. with mean zero and unknown non-singular residual covariance matrix E(u t u 0 t ) = P u and existing fourth moments. 17 Consequently, we allow for contemporaneous correlation in the residuals but no auto-correlation.
Evidently, this is an inherently reduced-form approach. As has been discussed above, we identify several mechanisms that can a¤ect the interrelation between re-15 For a discussion see e. g. Baldwin (2004 ), Bhagwati (1992 , Krueger (1995) , Panagariya (1999 ), Summers (1991 ), Creamer (2003 , Pomfret (2006 ), Bergsten (1997 ), and Folsom (2008 . 16 For a detailed discussion of VAR models see e. g. Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004) gional and multilateral trade liberalization. We cannot determine the magnitude of each e¤ect separately, but instead estimate the net e¤ect of the combined mechanisms. For instance, if the sum of coe¢ cients 12 (L)# t on t is negative, then the negative e¤ects, such as the diversion of policy makers' attention, dominate and
RTAs have a negative e¤ect on multilateral trade liberalization. If they are positive, then the positive in ‡uences, such as the generation of reputation, are more important, i. e. RTAs have a positive e¤ect on multilateral trade liberalization.
Step Three: Impulse-Response-Functions and Granger-causality Analysis
In a third step, we analyze the causal interrelation between regional and multilateral trade liberalization. We investigate the reaction of GATT/WTO trade liberalization on RTA liberalization and vice versa using impulse-response-functions.
Impulse-response-functions trace out the expected response of y it+s to a unit change in y jt , holding constant all past values of y t . 18 In particular, one can use impulseresponse-functions to investigate the response of one event to the impact of the other.
While the signs of the individual coe¢ cients are of some interest, our primary focus is testing -overall -whether trade liberalization on one institutional level causes trade liberalization on the other institutional level. That is, can we reasonably say that GATT/WTO liberalizes trade as a reaction to RTA trade liberalization, and vice versa? Our main empirical tool for doing so is the Granger-causality test.
Following Granger (1969) , variable X causes variable Y if the forecasting of the latter is improved by incorporating in the analysis information concerning X and its past. 19 In our case, we test the following two null hypotheses: For the VAR analysis, we use the two series obtained from the gravity model estimation. 21 The Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1973 (Akaike , 1974 suggests the endogenous lag order 3 for the bivariate model. In order to save degrees of freedom, we take advantage of sequential elimination algorithms which preselect the speci…c lagged variables that are to be estimated in the model (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004, and Brüggemann and Lütkepohl, 2001) . The speci…ed VAR model is estimated by OLS using the software package JMulti.
Empirical Results

Gravity Equation
The gravity equation is estimated with FE-PML with the results being reported in table 1. Note that the results from the FE-PML estimation are robust to FE-PML with only non-zero observations (intensive trade margin) in table 9, while they di¤er from the traditional FE-OLS estimation displayed in table 10 (both in the appendix).
Regarding the control variables, the coe¢ cient estimates meet the expectations and are in line with the standard gravity literature. In particular GATT/WTO membership of only one trading partner has a signi…cantly positive impact on bilateral trade. The imports of GATT/WTO members from non-participants (Importer in GATT/WTO) are about 52% higher (exp(0.42)-1), while the exports of GATT/WTO members to non-participants (Exporter in GATT/WTO) increase 20 The list of countries as well as data sources are reported in tables 6 and 7. 21 The tests on the two realizations'stationarity can be found in table 11 in the appendix. by 51%. This result has been interpreted as a public goods or selection e¤ect of GATT/WTO membership (e. g. Subramanian and Wei, 2007, p. 165) .
The Generalized System of Preferences negatively a¤ects both the exports of GSP recipients (GSP-recipient-exports) as well as the exports of granting countries (GSP-donor-exports). This result seems to be counter-intuitive since GSP programs are intended to foster developing countries' exports by granting preferred import duties on selected products by industrialized countries (UNCTAD, 2008) . However, the literature discusses several problems inherent to GSP schemes which might lead to disincentives causing distortions in the economic structure and trading patterns of GSP recipients in the long-run (e. g. Hoekman and Özden, 2005, Dowlah, 2008) . fectively implemented and eventually failed during that period (Pomfret, 2007, and Panagariya, 1999) . In addition, these …rst attempts of the so-called …rst wave of regionalism during the 1950s/1960s were characterized by "shallow"integration which did not get beyond mere tari¤ liberalization and rarely took place between developed and less developed countries but rather among countries with similar income level (Limao, 2007 , WTO, 2009c , and McGill, 2009 ). Generally, the e¤ects of RTAs on international trade were limited. With the ongoing process of regional liberalization and the wider scope of RTA liberalization, the e¤ect of RTAs on members' trade increased signi…cantly.
The time-speci…c impact of GATT/WTO is more volatile and has two periods with particularly strong e¤ects, namely 1960-1973 and 1985-1992 internal market in 1992 (Ethier, 1998 , Pomfret, 2007 , and Panagariya, 1999 . The third wave of regionalism started at the beginning of the 2000s and does not seem to have any major e¤ects neither on the impact of RTAs on international trade nor on the e¤ect of GATT/WTO.
VAR Estimation
We use the two time series obtained from the gravity analysis to estimate the e¤ect of multilateral on regional trade liberalization and vice versa. In particular, we set up a bivariate VAR model regressing the two variables on their past values. Due to the limited number of observations, we employ sequential elimination algorithms which preselect the speci…c lagged variables that are to be estimated in the model (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004, and Brüggemann and Lütkepohl, 2001) . 23 The results of the VAR model estimated with three lags are shown in table 2. The left-hand panel shows the trade e¤ect of multilateral trade liberalization (GATT/WTO-e¤ect) as dependent variable, with lagged values of multilateral and regional trade liberalization as the explanatory variables. The right-hand panel displays the trade impact of regional trade liberalization as the dependent variable, with lagged values of any multilateral and regional trade liberalization as the explanatory variables.
The results of the system equation regression indicate that both the net e¤ect of previous multilateral liberalization as well as the net e¤ect of regional liberalization on contemporaneous multilateral liberalization are signi…cantly positive. Similarly, the net e¤ects of multilateral and regional liberalization on subsequent regional liberalization are signi…cantly positive. 23 According to standard residual tests, such as the Portmanteau test (Ljung and Box, 1978) and the Breusch-Godfrey LM test (e. g. Godfrey, 1988), residual auto-correlation is not indicated (see table 12 in the appendix). The Lomnicki-Jarque-Bera tests (Lomnicki, 1961, and Jarque and Bera, 1987) suggest that both u 1 and u 2 are consistent with a standard normal distribution. Additionally, the ARCH-LM tests (Engle, 1982) assure heteroskedasticity-consistent estimation, i. e. we can continue applying the speci…ed VAR model. *** denotes significance on 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level. Sample range [1957, 2006] . SD in parentheses. 
Impulse-Response-Functions and Granger-causality analysis
We investigate the dynamic interrelations between multilateral and regional liberalization by using forecast error impulse-response-functions (IRF). The left panel of …gure 2 illustrates how the expected e¤ect of multilateral trade liberalization under GATT/WTO reacts to a unit change of the trade e¤ect of regional liberalization while the right panel shows the response of regional liberalization to a unit change in multilateral liberalization. 24 The results indicate that multilateral trade liberalization reacts in a statistically signi…cant way in the …rst and second (and third according to Hall's percentile) year after regional trade liberalization has taken place (left-hand panel). Technically speaking, if RTAs liberalize trade so that the trade volume increases by one unit, the expected response of GATT/WTO is multilateral trade liberalization associated with a trade increase by 1.6 units. Intuitively, an RTA-induced increase in trade is followed by multilateral trade liberalization in the subsequent years, whereby this GATT/WTO driven liberalization response is even stronger in the …rst subsequent year than the regional liberalization stimulus. This …nding might not only support 24 The plots also contain the 90% Efron and Hall percentiles con…dence intervals which are bootstrapped with 2000 replications (B=2000) over 10 periods (h=10).
RTA_coef --> WTO_coef
WTO_coef --> RTA_coef -1,00 the hypothesis of double trade activism, where countries use regional as well as multilateral institutions as complements to liberalize trade (Trejos, 2005) , but also indicates that RTA liberalization might be a promotive impulse so that even stronger multilateral trade liberalization is possible.
The Granger-causality test indicates that RTA liberalization Granger-causes multilateral trade liberalization under GATT/WTO (table 3) .
The lack of any negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients in the impulseresponse-function suggests that regional trade liberalization does not have a net negative e¤ect on multilateral trade liberalization. This …nding supports the Summers (1991)-hypothesis which emphasizes the positive impact of regional arrangements on the MTS. According to Bergsten (1997), RTAs are able to detent political tensions between nations, e. g. in Europe after WW II, which can also alleviate multilateral negotiations. Additionally, RTAs can stimulate both internal and international negotiation dynamics. Since RTAs provide for more ‡exible and e¢ cient negotiations than multilateral agreements, RTAs can serve as testing …elds for new liberaliza-tion ideas which can subsequently be negotiated in the multilateral setting, e. g. services or intellectual property rights (WTO, 2009c , Trejos, 2005 , Pomfret, 2006 , Bergsten, 1997 , and Folsom, 2008 . Moreover, members of RTAs can gain stability and reputation through their commitment to regional arrangements which is likely to have positive e¤ects for negotiations on the multilateral level, like in the case of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (Paiva and Gazel, 2003) .
When analyzing possible e¤ecfs of multilateral on regional trade liberalization, the right-hand panel of …gure 2 to some degree suggests that regional trade liberalization might respond in a positive way to multilateral trade liberalization. However, evidence on the causality tests (table 3) indicate that GATT/WTO liberalization does not Granger-cause RTA liberalization, overall. This result might be interpreted that regional liberalization additional to multilateral liberalization is not an attractive option.
Taken together, the Granger-causality analyses indicate an unidirectional causality relation from GATT/WTO to RTAs. An increase in RTA trade liberalization stimulates multilateral trade liberalization by GATT/WTO, however not vice versa.
We can respond to the question of Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) that the relationship between the multilateral system and regionalism is characterized by an asymmetric friendship.
Are the Results Robust to Models Controlling for Global Developments?
Generally, causality in a bivariate analysis could be due to omitted variables. To avoid incorrect inferences, we integrate several additional variables in our vector auto-regressive (VAR) system and test the causality relations again. In particular, we complement the VAR model with several variables controlling for the number of Generally, the impulse-response-fuctions support the …ndings obtained from the core section. If RTAs liberalize trade, the expected response of GATT/WTO is multilateral trade liberalization (left-hand panel, …gure 3). According to the causality tests, we …nd evidence that regional trade liberalization signi…cantly Granger-causes multilateral trade liberalization (table 4) The impulse-response-functions on the right hand-side indicate a positive response of RTA liberalization on multilateral liberalization (…gure 3). In contrast to the core analysis above, we …nd support for the hypothesis that GATT/WTO liberalization Granger-causes regional trade liberalization (table 4), although the response of GATT/WTO liberalization to RTA liberalization is much stronger than vice versa. Three …ndings might be of interest. The IRF of model 2 indicates that 25 The corresponding estimation results are reported in table 13 in the appendix. the reaction of regional liberalization on multilateral liberalization is positive in the …rst subsequent year, and additionally in periods 3-5 with a break in period 2.
Regarding model 3, regional liberalization seems to respond to a certain degree to multilateral liberalization (…gure 3), while we …nd no evidence of Granger-causality (table 4 ). Referring to model 6, we …nd an alternating response of regional trade liberalization on GATT/WTO liberalization -similar to the pattern in the opposite direction.
Summarizing, we …nd -based on Granger-causality tests -a so-called feedback relationship between multilateral and regional trade liberalization, overall. The results indicate that multilateral trade liberalization responds in a signi…cantly positive way during the …rst years after regional liberalization has taken place. Likewise, RTA liberalization reactions are signi…cantly positive during the …rst periods after multilateral liberalization has taken place. However, only in model 2 we …nd a sig-ni…cantly negative response of GATT/WTO to RTA liberalization in a later period, while GATT/WTO liberalization reacts positive on RTA liberalization also in later periods. Additionally, multilateral liberalization seems not to Granger-cause RTA liberalization in model 3.
Are the Results Robust to Variation in the Model' s Lag-Length?
This section tests whether the results are robust to a variation in the VAR model's lag order. In particular, we consider a shorter model accounting for two lags (model 7) as well as models with higher order incorporating 4-6 lags (models 8-10). The IRFs are displayed in …gure 4 while the corresponding results of the Granger-causality tests are reported in table 5. 26 The impulse-response-functions on the left hand-side clearly indicate that multilateral liberalization responds in a signi…cantly positive way to regional trade liberalization during the …rst two to three subsequent years across the various estimations.
Seemingly, the reaction e¤ect of WTO liberalization to RTA liberalization is not sensitive to various lag orders of our VAR model, neither is the magnitude of the reaction e¤ect. Generally, it seems that the duration of the reaction e¤ect tends to last longer for VAR models with higher lag order: For models with two or three lags (model 1 and 7), the response of multilateral liberalization is signi…cantly positive during the …rst two subsequent years after RTA liberalization. In comparison, for models with four or more lags (models 8-10), the response of multilateral liberalization is signi…cantly positive during the …rst three subsequent years after RTA liberalization. Additionally, we …nd robust evidence that regional trade liberalization Granger-causes multilateral liberalization, although the signi…cance decreases with an increase in the lag order.
The IRFs on the right hand-side robustly indicate that regional liberalization does not respond to multilateral liberalization. In fact, none of the reactions are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Additionally, we …nd no support for the hypothesis that GATT/WTO liberalization Granger-causes RTA liberalization.
Conclusion
Since the …rst wave of regionalism until the 1980s, discussion on regionalism was characterized by static trade creation and trade diversion e¤ects of regional trade agreements (RTAs). With the second wave of regionalism during the 1990s, the debate on regionalism turned to the dynamic interrelation between regional integration and multilateral trade liberalization. In this context, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) ask whether RTAs and the multilateral trading system are "strangers, friends, or foes"? We …nd robust evidence that multilateral trade liberalization responds in a signi…cantly positive way during the …rst years after regional trade liberalization.
Additionally, we …nd robust evidence that RTA liberalization signi…cantly Grangercauses GATT/WTO liberalization. A sensitivity analysis indicates that these results are robust to changes in control variables an the VAR model's lag order. In contrast, our results do not robustly indicate that regional trade liberalization responds in a signi…cantly positive way to multilateral trade liberalization. Summarizing, our results suggest an unidirectional relationship between multilateralism and regionalism. While multilateral trade liberalization reacts signi…cantly positive to regional trade liberalization whereby Granger-causality is signi…cant, this result does not hold in the opposite direction. Using the terms of Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) , we might call this relation an asymmetric friendship. At least, we can ensure that regional trade liberalization does not react in a signi…cantly negative way to multilateral trade liberalization.
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